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1 Introduction
In this era of globalized knowledge economy, the education system, by shaping a countrys human
capital, may exert signicant inuences on its comparative advantages in international trade. And
conversely, a countrys trade pattern and intensity may a¤ect how its education system is run. Such
interactions between education and trade could be seen in recurrent reviews of education policies
by nations across the world. In the US, for example, the National Commission on Excellence in
Education (1983) claimed in an inuential report that America is at risk: The risk is not only that
the Japanese make automobiles more e¢ ciently than Americans . . . , or that American machine
tools . . . are being displaced by German products. It is also that these developments signify a
redistribution of trained capability throughout the globe. . . . If only to keep and improve on the
slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of
our educational system ...1
In spite of the clear importance and urgency of educational reform in its role of a¤ecting coun-
triescomparative advantages, we are not aware of any formal analysis in the economics literature
to shed light on this matter. This paper makes a rst attempt at providing a theory on the two-way
interactions between education policies and trade. In particular, we show that any initial di¤erence
in education policies across countries that contributes to countriescomparative advantages will be
further enlarged when countries move from autarky to trade. The intuition is that international
trade increases the returns to the sector of comparative advantage, and thus induces countries to
further di¤erentiate their education systems in order to maximize gains from specialization. As a
result, a small di¤erence in initial education systems across countries, possibly due to historical or
cultural variation, will be further amplied by the increase in international trade.
In this paper, we focus on an important characterization of a countrys education system, which
is the degree of centralization or homogenization imposed on the curriculum, and its e¤ect on a
countrys talent distribution. A more homogeneous structure of curricula across schools improves
1For related discussions on the US education, see Schaub and Baker (1991), Westbury (1992), Bracey (1996),
Hanushek (2002), and Dillon (2007), among others. For recent educational reforms in other countries, see for example
Takayama (2007) on Japan, Mok (2005) on East Asia, and Green (1999) for general discussions on the e¤ects of
globalization on education across countries.
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the likelihood that the same set of subjects are taught, and delivered in similar manners to the
students; as a result, students are more likely to acquire a common set of skills. This type of
education system is often associated with a centralized curriculum council that sets and enforces
a uniform curriculum via textbooks, instructional guide to teachers, curriculum evaluation, or
national standardized tests, as is evident in Japan and some East Asian countries. The resulting
pressures to conform with the uniform standards in terms of education outputs, however, leave
relatively little room for individual explorations and hence could push the more-talented students
toward the mean as well as the lower-ability students. In contrast, if schools/teachers do not need to
follow a standardized set of curricula or performance targets, this tends to introduce more variation
in student performance, as students have more freedom to pursue their individual interests and
realize their potentials under a exible curriculum; without the necessary discipline, however, the
less-talented students may fail to acquire the basic set of skills. This approach is often carried out
in a decentralized education system as is exemplied by the US system. Thus, relatively speaking,
the Japanese style of education system promotes homogeneity in the distribution of skills, while the
US education system leads to more diversity. The education systems in other countries, di¤erent
in their orientation toward these two approaches, generally fall in between these two extremes
(Cummings 1999).
We show in theory that by altering the resulting talent distribution, di¤erent educational ap-
proaches will lead to di¤erences in comparative advantage and trade structure in countries with
otherwise identical economic constraints. Specically, the decentralized education system in the US
tends to promote talent diversity in its work force, which enhances the productivity of industries
that benet from worker skill heterogeneity, e.g., software and movie; in contrast, with a central-
ized education system, Japanese work force tends to be more homogenous in their skills, which
increases the productivity of industries characterized by long and complex production processes,
e.g., automobile and machinery. It then follows that countries with more decentralized education
systems will have a comparative advantage in the software-type industries and countries with more
centralized education systems a comparative advantage in the automobile-type industries.
Given the e¤ects of education system on production and a countrys comparative advantage, we
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show that the endogenous choice of education system across countries will exhibit more divergence
under trade than under autarky. This is because the equilibrium price with trade will fall in between
autarky prices and thus strengthen the incentives of a country to specialize more in the sector of
its comparative advantage, not only via automatic resource reallocation across sectors with a given
work force, but also through active adjustment in education policies to reshape the composition of
its work force and the position of its production possibility frontier.
In particular, we identify the choice of education system under autarky by individual countries
who may di¤er in their costs of implementing homogeneous curricula, but are otherwise identical in
economic constraints and initial talent distributions. We then characterize the choice of education
system under trade that is socially optimal for the world as a whole. This is compared with the
noncooperative choice in the Nash equilibrium where each country maximizes its own welfare taking
into account the terms-of-trade e¤ect of its education policies. It is shown that the di¤erence in
education systems across countries under trade is larger than under autarky. However, the cross-
country di¤erence in education systems under the Nash equilibrium is less than what is socially
optimal for the world. The intuition is that the incentive to specialize through more divergent
education systems is weakened in each country by the accompanying terms-of-trade loss, which on
the other hand cancels out for all countries in the world welfares calculation.
We conduct some preliminary empirical analysis to demonstrate our theorys empirical rele-
vance. Based on the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) dataset,
which contains information on student performance and curriculum structure, we propose some
measures of curriculum centralization to capture the theorys characterization of national educa-
tion systems in terms of the degree of homogenization imposed on studentsskill formation. We
show that in the sample of OECD countries, a more centralized curriculum structure is indeed
associated with a lower skill diversity, and the relationship is statistically signicant and consistent
across di¤erent years of study. Furthermore, as the trade intensity between a pair of countries in-
creases, their di¤erence in curriculum centralization also tends to increase. This is consistent with
our theoretical prediction that trade tends to reinforce countries initial di¤erences in education
systems. However, given the caveats that will be noted in the empirical section, more research into
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the empirical measures of education systems is needed to provide more persuasive conclusions.
Viewed from a broader perspective, this paper contributes to the literature in two ways: First, it
demonstrates the possibility of education policy as a new source of comparative advantage in trade,
and second, it emphasizes how trade can in turn a¤ect a countrys institutions such as education
systems. To our knowledge, this endogenous determination of both education system and trade
pattern as an equilibrium outcome has not been examined in the literature.
This paper is closely related to the literature on human capital (talent) and trade. This literature
generally falls into two branches: The rst branch takes talent distribution as given and analyzes its
e¤ect on comparative advantage and trade pattern (see Grossman and Maggi 2000 for example),
while the second branch studies the e¤ect of trade on the stock of human capital using xed
human capital production functions (see Findlay and Kierzkowski 1983, and Bond et al. 2003
for example). Our paper integrates these two strands of literature by explicitly modeling the
triangular relationship between education policy, human capital and trade. The introduction of
education policy in our model inuences the human capital formation process and determines the
composition of human capital in a country. The resulting talent distribution then a¤ects a countrys
comparative advantage and trade pattern (as in the rst literature). When countries endogenously
choose their education policies relative to their trading partners to maximize social welfare, there
are feedback e¤ects of trade on human capital (as in the second literature). This paper thus provides
new insights into the important role of education policy in a¤ecting the relationship between human
capital and trade.2
2The rst branch of the literature starts with the pioneering work by Grossman and Maggi (2000), who show that
between two trading countries, the one with a more diverse (alternatively, homogeneous) talent pool tends to exhibit
a comparative advantage in producing goods or services with a submodular (alternatively, supermodular) technology.
This may account for the trade pattern between the US and Japan, where the US has more diverse talents and
exports software, while Japan has more homogeneous talents and exports cars. The e¤ect of talent distribution on
trade is also examined by other studies based on alternative mechanisms including the role of costly monitoring of
workers (Grossman 2004), the implications of two-dimensional skill heterogeneity (Ohnsorge and Treer 2007), the
trade of high-tech versus primary product (Bougheas and Riezman 2007), and the empirical evidence about the e¤ect
of skill dispersion on trade patterns (Bombardini et al. 2009). The second branch of the literature includes Findlay
and Kierzkowski (1983) and Bond et al. (2003) among others. In Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), it is observed that
trade will accentuate the autarky di¤erence between countries in skilled-unskilled labor proportions. This is similar
in spirit to our result that the initial pattern of comparative advantage is sustained and the di¤erence in the human
capital composition between countries is augmented by trade. By allowing endogenous formation of both physical
and human capital, Bond et al. (2003) show that the ranking of countriesrelative factor abundance and trade pattern
may actually persist or reverse over time. Such indeterminacy is thus in contrast with the above result.
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In another strand of literature, several papers also explicitly link education with trade but
di¤er from us in the issues and the specic education policies studied. Kim and Kim (2000)
assume that school education enhances general human capital versus industry-specic skills, which
together with international trade allows workers to move easily to the fastest-growing industry
and hence facilitates economic growth. In an oligarchy society where landed elites have more
political power, Falkinger and Grossmann (2005) show that public education investment conducive
to industrialization is typically lower in an open economy than in autarky; this is similar in spirit to
our result that an open economy may adopt a more extreme education approach than in autarky.
Bougheas et al. (2009) also analyze the possible e¤ect of trade on a countrys education policy.
They formulate the education policy, however, as a choice by a small open economy of whether to
move up or down the skill chain, taking the terms of trade as given; this is in contrast with our focus
on the education policys role in a¤ecting the diversity of human capital and the optimal allocation
of talent across sectors. More importantly, our analysis takes into account the consequence of
education policies on the equilibrium trade prices and patterns, which enables us to study the
interactions of education policies across countries and their endogenous divergence.
The current paper also connects with the economics literature on education that examines how
di¤erent education regimes (public versus private, ability tracking versus ability pooling) a¤ect the
dispersion of skills and aggregate output in closed economies (see for example Bénabou 1996, Epple
and Romano 1998, Fernández and Rogerson 1998, Takii and Tanaka 2009). An innovative feature
of the current paper in comparison to this literature is that the education regimes are endogenously
determined across countries and inherently linked with international trade. The papers focus
on the degree of curriculum centralization in an education system also highlights an important
dimension distinct from the above literatures typical emphasis on school nancing methods.
The education literature has only recently begun to assess the implications of globalization on
education policies (Green 1997, Burbules and Torres 2000, Mok 2005). Though there is consider-
able convergence at the level of policy rhetoric and general policy objectives, there is less evidence
of any systematic convergence at the level of structures and processes in di¤erent countries(Green
1999). This is consistent with our nding in this paper that di¤erences in education systems across
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countries may be a persistent pattern reinforced by trade. To our knowledge, this result is new to
the education-related literature and may provide a fresh perspective on how education policies are
formed.
This paper is organized as follows. The elements of the model are described in Section 2. The
endogenous choice of education system is analyzed in Section 3. We take our model to data and
present some preliminary empirical evidence in Section 4. Section 5 discusses modeling choices and
possible extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 The Education System
Suppose there is a unit measure of a continuum of pupils indexed by i, whose innate abilities ai0 are
not individually observable, but follow a distribution G() with support [al0; ah0]  (0;+1). All
pupils have to go through an education system that may possibly change their initial skills. The
education system is characterized by a parameter  2 [0; 1], which indicates the degree of curriculum
centralization/homogeneity imposed on each student. Specically, a pupil with an innate ability
ai0 will acquire a skill level ai at graduation such that
(1) ai = (1  )ai0 + am;
where am =
R ah0
al0
ai0dG(ai0) is the average ability of the cohort. Thus, an education system with a
high  will push all studentsskills to the middle and reduce the skill diversity, while keeping the
mean ability unchanged.
Each pupils adulthood skill ai is publicly observed with a support [al; ah]  [al0; ah0], where
ah   al = (1   )(ah0   al0), and its corresponding distribution function is G(ai am1  )  F (ai; ).
We will often write the adulthood distribution as F (ai) to simplify presentations, bearing in mind
that it depends on . The adults are ranked according to their abilities such that ai  aj for i < j.
We can generalize (1) to allow an additional benet e > 0 of education that is independent of
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the curriculum centralization, that is, ai = (1  )ai0+ am+ e. It is straightforward to verify that
the subsequent results will not be a¤ected. We take the functional form (1) henceforth to focus on
the education systems impact on talent diversity and abstract from its potentially positive e¤ect
on human capital accumulation.
This simple model of education attempts to capture the necessary tension between equipping
all students with a common set of knowledge versus promoting talent diversity. The former goal
is usually better achieved with a more standardized set of curricula, where students have to go
through the same subjects, and numerous exercises and exams that test whether they have met
required standards before they can go to the next level of study. The time and e¤orts committed
to following the same curriculum and activities, however, often discourage students from exploring
and acquiring new knowledge in their own ways, and hence may reduce the creativity component
of human capital (Mayer et al. 1991). The opposite is true for pursuing the second goal, where
exible curricula and lenient standards are set to leave more freedom for individual exploration and
hence may preserve more talent diversity. Education systems may vary across countries in their
orientation toward these two goals. Among industrial countries, Japan and the US are arguably the
two prominent examples at the opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of curriculum centralization.
The innate or initial abilities ai0 are taken to be unobservable to educators or even to the student
herself/himself. This is to underlie the di¢ culty of the education system to correctly evaluate each
students true talent and to tailor the teaching method  according to each individuals ability. For
example, if the initial abilities were fully observable, the education resources would be best utilized
to raise the skills of the less-talented students with a more disciplined education method but those
of the more-talented students with a more exible curriculum. Alternatively, if the innate abilities
ai0 were known to the students, a menu of education methods could be o¤ered such that students
self select into di¤erent schemes. The assumption of unobservability of initial abilities highlights
the inevitable trade-o¤ of positive and negative e¤ects of choosing a particular education style on
the human capital of a country.
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2.2 The Economy
Technology. We lay out the structure of the economy below and demonstrate the implications
of given education systems on production and trade patterns. The results are consistent with the
existing work in the literature with exogenous talent distributions.3 Our main departure from the
literature starts in Section 3 where we explicitly analyze the choice of education system.
There are two industries in the economy. In the automobile industry, the production technology
is supermodular with decreasing returns to overall talent,4
yA = [a(1)
 + a(2) +   + a(n)]= ; 0 <  <  < 1
where n is the number of tasks required. The supermodularity of the auto production is reected
by the fact that @2yA=@a(j)@a(j0) > 0, for all j 6= j0 2 f1; 2; : : : ng and the decreasing returns to
overall talent by the fact that  < 1. In the other industry, the software industry, the output is
completely reective of individual talent,
yS = a
 ;  > 1
and exhibits increasing returns to the talent. Let p = pS=pA denote the relative price of software.
As shown in Grossman and Maggi (2000) or similarly argued in Kremer (1993), the output of an
industry characterized by supermodular technology is maximized when workers of the same ability
work in the same team (rm). Thus, in a competitive equilibrium, where each rm earns no positive
prot, the wage structure of the auto industry satises
(2) wA(a) =
(na)=
n
 a;
3Comparison between our setup and that of Grossman and Maggi (2000) and the reasons for the modications
are provided in Section 5.
4The specic production functional form for the auto industry is adopted for illustrative purposes. The same
results can be achieved with the following general functional form: yA  H(a(1); a(2);    ; a(n)) with symmet-
ric tasks such that @2H=@a(j)@a(j0) > 0, for all j 6= j0 2 f1; 2; : : : ng and that H(a(1); a(2);    ; a(n)) =
H(a(1); a(2);    ; a(n)), with 0 <  and 0 <  < 1.
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where   n  1 corresponds to the benchmark wage when each task is performed by workers of a
unit talent. Thus, in each auto rm, the workers sharing the same talent level divide evenly and
exhaust the revenue of the auto output. Firms are indi¤erent between hiring a lower-talent team
and a higher-talent team, as the wage payment is reective of the output response to the talent
level. On the other hand, the software industrys wage structure in a competitive equilibrium is
simply
(3) wS(a) = pa
where each software worker receives the whole value of his/her output.
Preferences. Individuals have identical preferences, which are represented by the utility func-
tion
u(cAi; cSi) = c

Aic
1 
Si ;
where 0 <  < 1, and cAi and cSi denote individual is consumption of cars and software, respec-
tively. The budget constraint is cAi+pcSi = wi, where wi is the individuals income that is equal to
either wA(ai) or wS(ai) depending on the workers occupation. The optimal consumption choices
are thus
cAi(p; wi) = wi;(4)
cSi(p; wi) =
(1  )wi
p
;(5)
which lead to the indirect utility function
(6) (p; wi) = (1  )1 p (1 )wi:
Talent Allocation Across Industries. Each worker takes as given the relative price of
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software p. A worker joins the auto industry if and only if wA(ai)  wS(ai), which implies
(7) ai 


p
 1
 
 ea(p).
As a workers wage income increases in his own ability at a decreasing rate if he works in the auto
industry but at an increasing rate if he works in the software industry, a worker will choose to work
in the software industry if his own ability is su¢ ciently high. In (7), ea(p) denotes the highest ability
of workers to join the auto industry, which coincides with the ability of the marginal worker who is
indi¤erent between joining either one of the two industries. This cuto¤ obviously hinges upon the
relative goods price.
Lemma 1 @ea@p < 0.
Proof. Based on the denition ea(p) in (7), we get @ea@p =   1  eap < 0:
The intuition is that, as the relative price of software p falls, a workers income in the software
industry drops; as a result, the cuto¤ talent level ea increases. When the price falls to pl  a h ,
even the most talented worker ah will become indi¤erent between working in either one of the
industries. On the other hand, when the price of software rises above ph  a l , even the least
talented worker al will be attracted to work in the software industry. When the cuto¤ ability is
equal to the mean am, the corresponding price is pm  a m , where pl  pm  ph holds due to
ah  am  al. For p 2 (pl; ph), there is incomplete specialization. Our following analyses focus on
the scenarios where there is incomplete specialization unless otherwise noted.
Given the talent allocation, the total outputs in the auto and software industry are, respectively,
YA (p; ) =
Z ea
al
yA(a)
dF (a)
n
= 
Z ea
al
adF (a);
YS(p; ) =
Z ah
ea adF (a):
Note that an auto rm consists of n workers of the same ability; thus, the density of auto rms is
1
n times the density of the auto workersabilities dF (a) in the above calculation of auto output.
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Production Possibility Frontier (PPF). The PPFs corresponding to two di¤erent education
systems with J > U are illustrated in Figure 1. The maximum potential output of software
Y maxS =
R ah
al
adF (a) is lower with a higher , as a higher  decreases the talent diversity and
the software output is convex in talent. On the contrary, the maximum potential output of cars
Y maxA = 
R ah
al
adF (a) is higher with a higher , as the auto output is concave in overall talent.
Thus, a country with a higher degree of curriculum centralization  in the education system will
have a PPF that is relatively skewed toward the auto output axis and vice versa for a country with
a lower level of . Note that the corresponding prices at the end points of the PPF are pl at Y maxA
and ph at Y maxS . With a higher , pl increases and ph decreases; thus, the curvature of PPF also
reduces with a higher .5
Note that for given  and PPF, an increase in the cuto¤ ability ea corresponds to a migration
of workers toward the auto sector from the software sector, which has a positive e¤ect on the auto
output and a negative e¤ect on the software:
@YA
@ea = eaf(ea) > 0;(8)
@YS
@ea =  eaf(ea) < 0:(9)
These two conditions imply that MRT   @YA@ea =@YS@ea = ea  , which is equal to p by (7), verifying
the optimality of the competitive equilibrium.
As indicated in Figure 1, for a large range of potential prices, the country with a higher level
of  will produce relatively more auto while the country with a lower level of  relatively more
software, given the same relative price p. Only when the price is extremely high, near the price
level at T
0
J , will we see a reversal of the positive relationship between the relative auto output and
the education policy . The following lemma species a su¢ cient condition on the price level for
the positive relationship to hold.
Lemma 2 @YA@

p
> 0 and @YS@

p
< 0 for p  pm, where jp denotes holding p constant.
5The range for incomplete specialization (pl; ph) is smaller, the higher the education policy . In the extreme
case when  = 1, the PPF becomes a straight line (not shown) with a constant slope pm, and there is incomplete
specialization only when the price is exactly equal to pm.
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Figure 1: E¤ects of Education System on PPF
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that an education system with a higher degree of curriculum centralization 
increases the output of the auto industry but decreases the output of the software industry when
the relative price of software is not too high. The intuition is as follows. With the price level
(and hence the cuto¤ talent level ea) held constant, an increase in  reduces the diversity of worker
abilities in both industries. Because the auto industrys output is concave in each rms worker
ability while the software industrys output is convex in each workers ability, a reduced diversity
in worker abilities in the above manner has a positive e¤ect on the aggregate auto output and a
negative e¤ect on the aggregate software output. Furthermore, an increase in  also changes the
identity (ea0 = ea am1  ) of the marginal workers and hence the density of workers in each industry.
Within the price range p  pm, however, the mean ability workers always work in the auto sector
(since am  ea), and thus an increase in  will increase the density of auto workers, reinforcing the
rst e¤ect. The condition p  pm is su¢ cient but not necessary for the results in Lemma 2 to
hold.6
6 In the price range p > pm such that the mean ability workers work in the software sector (ea < am), a higher 
will reduce the worker density in the auto sector and raise that in the software sector. This density e¤ect may more
than o¤set the average e¤ect and alter the result. In particular, the reversal is more likely, the further the relative
price p increases above pm and the closer the cuto¤ level ea approaches al.
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2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Autarky Equilibrium. In the autarky equilibrium, the domestic markets of both auto and
software are clear so that the ratio of total supplies for cars and software is equal to the ratio of
their total demands. That is,
(10)
bYAbpbYS =
R
cA(bp; w(a))dF (a)bp R cS(bp; w(a))dF (a) = 1   ;
where the second equality is derived from (4) and (5), and a decoration bx over a variable x indicates
the autarky equilibrium value of the corresponding variable x. This leads to the autarky equilibrium
price
(11) bp = 1  

bYAbYS ;
which is unique because the LHS is strictly increasing in p, while the RHS of the equation strictly
decreases in p: @RHS@p =
@RHS
@ea @ea@p < 0 due to @YA@ea > 0 > @YS@ea by (8) and (9), and @ea@p < 0 by Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 A su¢ cient condition for p  pm (or equivalently, am  ea) to hold is
(A1)   1
2
and G(am)  1
2
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma shows that under condition (A1), the equilibrium price will not be larger than pm,
or equivalently, workers with the mean talent level will work in the auto sector. The same outcome
that the mean talent workers work in the supermodular (auto) sector is achieved in Grossman and
Maggi (2000) under the assumption of symmetric talent distributions; in comparison, condition
(A1) covers more grounds by allowing asymmetric talent distributions as long as the mean talent
level is not above the median. The assumption   12 on the preferences implies that a larger
proportion of consumption is on manufacturing goods characterized by production chains (e.g.,
cars, electronics, food, clothing) than on creative products characterized by individual performance
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(e.g., software, movies, books, concerts), which seems consistent with reality. In what follows, we
assume condition (A1) holds.7
Lemma 4 The autarky equilibrium price increases with the degree of curriculum centralization in
the education system, i.e., @bp@ > 0.
Proof. Dene V (p; )  (1   )YA(p; )   pYS(p; ). Condition (11) can be rewritten as
V (bp; ) = 0, based on which we get
(12)
@bp
@
=  @V (p; )=@
@V (p; )=@p

p=bp =  
(1  ) @YA@

p
  p @YS@

p
(1  )@YA@p   p@YS@p   YS

p=bp
> 0
since @YA@

p
> 0 > @YS@

p
by Lemma 2 and @YS@p =
@YS
@ea @ea@p > 0 > @YA@ea @ea@p = @YA@p by (8), (9), and
Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 shows that the more centralized the education system, the higher the relative autarky
price for software in equilibrium. The intuition is obvious; as the relative supply of software is lower
when  is higher and as the preference is homothetic, a closed economy with a higher  will have a
higher relative price for software.
Free Trade Equilibrium. Suppose that a world consists of two representative countries,
Japan (J) and the US (U). They have the same economic structure as described above, but
di¤erent education systems (J > U ). That is, Japans education system is more centralized
than the USs, and as a result, the adult talent distribution ai is more homogenous in Japan than
in the US, though the talent distribution among children (ai0) is identical in the two countries.
Rationales for such a di¤erence in education systems across countries even though they are the
same in economic structure to begin with will be discussed in Section 3.
Given the di¤erent education systems (J > U ), Lemma 4 suggests that Japan will have a
higher relative autarky price for software than the US (bpJ > bpU ). Thus, with the possibility of
7Note that condition (A1) is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for p  pm, which is in turn a su¢ cient but
not necessary condition for Lemma 2. Thus, there is ample room for violations of condition (A1) without invalidating
the positive relationship between the relative auto output and the education policy .
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trade, Japan (the US) will have a comparative advantage in cars (software) and will export cars
(software).
By similar arguments as in the case for the autarky price bp, we know that the free trade
equilibrium price p is uniquely determined by
(13) p =
1  

Y AJ + Y AU
Y SJ + Y SU
;
where YAJ and YAU are the auto outputs in Japan and the US, respectively, and YSJ and YSU are
the software outputs in the two countries. A decoration x over a variable x indicates the free trade
equilibrium value of the corresponding variable x. It follows that bpJ > p > bpU holds for any given
education systems in the two countries with J > U .
The free trade equilibrium price p is higher when either J or U is higher, as either change will
increase the relative supply of cars in the world market. The following lemma shows this formally.
Lemma 5 The free trade equilibrium price increases with either countrys curriculum centralization
in the education system, i.e., @p@J > 0 and
@p
@U
> 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Endogenous Education System
In the previous section, we take education systems as given and analyze its inuence on the for-
mation of talent distributions. The predictions on the trade pattern are similar to the existing
literature taking talent distributions across countries as given. We now explore the endogenous
choice of education systems.8
We begin the analysis by characterizing the socially optimal education system under autarky.
Given the di¤erent choices of education systems under autarky, we then analyze how countries
8We have generalized some aspects of the existing models at the cost of restricting other aspects to arrive at a
structure that embeds inherent trade-o¤s in setting education policies. Most existing models do not exhibit such
trade-o¤s; instead, there exists some strictly dominating PPF in these models if PPFs (talent distributions) are
allowed to change by policies.
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will react to the possibility of trade and how their optimal choice of education system will change
compared to autarky.
A higher degree of curriculum centralization in the education system usually corresponds to
more rules and regulations imposed on the curriculum, the textbooks, the allocation of school
hours, the frequency of tests, and the monitoring of student performance. Requirements such as
these entail administrative costs, e.g., to communicate, implement, enforce, and evaluate the rules
and regulations. They may also translate into disutility for each student undergoing the system.
For example, the disutility could be the lack of exibility to pursue ones own subjects of interest
at di¤erent pace or depth, the stress endured during each test, the leisure time sacriced for study,
and so on. The more centralized the education system, the more stringent the rules and regulations,
and the more administrative cost and disutility it may entail. For a given degree of curriculum
centralization, some country may nd it easier to implement than others. For example, if a country
is more homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition, the country may nd it less costly to set and
implement a common set of curriculum and standards, as educators/pupils in the system share
similar cultural, linguistic, behavioral or religious traits. In a country where the national/federal
government has a stronger administrative capacity relative to the local/state government, the cost
of implementing a centralized curriculum may also be lower. To capture these observations, we
assume that imposing curriculum centralization entails a disutility of Kj()  kj in country j,
where j = J; U , and 0 < kJ < kU . That is, one society attaches a lower disutility to a given
level of curriculum centralization than the other society, possibly due to di¤erences in their ethnic
compositions or political systems as discussed above. In particular, we assume that the Japanese
society nd it less costly than the American society in making e¤orts to conform to homogeneity
in education standards (Section 5 provides more discussions on why this seems to be the case).
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3.1 Education Systems under Autarky
Given the indirect utility function in (6), the net aggregate welfare of a country implementing a
degree of curriculum centralization  is
U() =
Z ah
al
 (p; w(a)) f(a)da  k
= (1  )1 p (1 )
Z ah
al
w(a)f(a)da  k
= (1  )1 p (1 )(YA + pYS)  k;(14)
where we have suppressed the dependence of most variables on the education policy  to simplify
presentations. The last equality holds since the total wage income of the population is equal to the
total value of production of the economy by perfect competition. In autarky, the price observes the
autarky equilibrium condition (11).
Let a denote the optimal education choice under autarky that maximizes U() and bpa the
corresponding autarky equilibrium price. The following rst order condition (FOC) must hold at
(; p) = (a; bpa):
@U()
@
= (1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YA
@

p
+ p
@YS
@

p
+

@YA
@p
+ p
@YS
@p

@p
@
+(YS   (1  )p 1YA)@p
@

  k
= (1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YA
@

p
+ p
@YS
@

p
!
  k = 0;(15)
where the second equality follows, rst because @YA@p + p
@YS
@p =
@YA
@ea @ea@p + p@YS@ea @ea@p = 0 by the fact that
MRT =  @YA@ea =@YS@ea = p, and second, by plugging in the autarky equilibrium condition (11). At
the optimal choice, the second order condition (SOC) @
2U()
@2

(;p)=(a;bpa) < 0 must also hold. Thus,
with kJ < kU , it follows that the optimal degree of curriculum centralization under autarky will be
higher in Japan than in the US, i.e., aJ > 
a
U .
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3.2 Education Systems under Trade
Small Open Economy. We rst characterize the unilateral optimal choice of education system
that would be made by a small open economy. That is, the country takes the world price as given
and does not take into account the e¤ect of its choice of education system on the world price.
The analysis here thus assumes away the terms-of-trade consideration by a large country when
setting the education policy. We will analyze the terms-of-trade e¤ect shortly. As will become
clear, many useful insights can be drawn from comparing this simple scenario against the other
more comprehensive scenarios.
Proposition 1 The optimal education system of a small open economy, s, decreases with the
given trade price, p.
Proof. The FOC to maximize the aggregate welfare of a small open economy taking the trade
price as given is
(16)
@U(; p)
@

=s
=
"
(1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YA
@

p
+ p
@YS
@

p
!#
=s
  k = 0:
Note that
@U(; p)
@p
= (1  )1 p (1 )

@YA
@p
+ p
@YS
@p

  (1  ) p 1YA + YS

= (1  )1 p (1 )[  (1  ) p 1YA + YS ];
where the second equality obtains because MRT = p. Based on the above condition, we get
@2U(; p)
@@p
= (1  )1 p (1 )
"
 (1  )p 1 @YA
@

p
+ 
@YS
@

p
#
< 0
since  < 1 and @YA@

p
> 0 > @YS@

p
by Lemma 2. This implies
@s
@p
=

@2U(; p)
@@p
=( @
2U(; p)
@2
)

=s
< 0;
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where
h
@2U(;p)
@2
i
=s
< 0 holds by the SOC for s.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in the relative price of software, p, will induce a small open
economy to adjust downward the the degree of curriculum centralization in its education system,
while the opposite is true when p goes down. Note that the autarky optimal education system of
country j, aj , in (15) coincides with its small-open-economy optimal education system in (16) if
the given trade price happens to be the same as its autarky price, p = bpaj , where j = J; U . That is,
aJ = 
s
J(bpaJ) and aU = sU (bpaU ).
Recall that as countries move from autarky to trade, the free trade price falls relative to the
autarky price of the country with an initially more centralized education system and rises relative
to the autarky price of the country with an initially more decentralized education system (bpaJ >
pa > bpaU ), where pa indicates the free trade equilibrium price when aJ and aU are adopted. Given
this, an important implication of Proposition 1 is that as countries move from autarky to trade,
a small open economy initially having a more centralized education system will further raise its
degree of curriculum centralization (as the relative price of software falls after trade compared to
its autarky level) and a small open economy initially having a more decentralized education system
will further lower its degree of curriculum centralization (as the relative price of software rises after
trade compared to its autarky level).
World Optimal Choice. We now analyze the optimal choice of education systems for the
two countries by a world social planner who takes into account the e¤ects of education systems on
equilibrium trade volumes and price. The world social planner chooses the education systems that
maximize the joint welfare of the two countries:
(17) Uw(J ; U ) = (1  )1 p (1 ) (YAJ + pYSJ + YAU + pYSU )  kJJ   kUU ;
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where the price observes the free trade equilibrium condition (13). Given (17), we obtain the
following FOC for J :
@Uw(J ; U )
@J
= (1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YAJ
@J

p
+ p
@YSJ
@J

p
+
@YAJ
@p
@p
@J
+ p
@YSJ
@p
@p
@J
+ YSJ
@p
@J
+
@YAU
@p
@p
@J
+ p
@YSU
@p
@p
@J
+ YSU
@p
@J
  (1  )p 1(YAJ + pYSJ + YAU + pYSU ) @p
@J

  kJ
= (1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YAJ
@J

p
+ p
@YSJ
@J

p
!
  kJ = 0;(18)
where the second equality follows by the fact that MRT = p in both countries and by plugging in
the free trade equilibrium condition (13). Similarly, we can obtain the following FOC for U :
(19)
@Uw(J ; U )
@U
= (1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YAU
@U

p
+ p
@YSU
@U

p
!
  kU = 0:
Let wJ (U ) denote the solution of J to (18) given any U , and similarly let 
w
U (J) denote
the solution of U to (19) given any J . It is straightforward to verify that
@2Uw(J ;U )
@J@U
< 0; thus,
it follows that @
w
J (U )
@U
< 0 and @
w
U (J )
@J
< 0. These two FOCs are illustrated in Figure 2. The
optimal choice of education systems by the world social planner, wJ and 
w
U , for Japan and the
US, corresponds to the intersection W of the two schedules wJ (U ) and 
w
U (J). The fact that
kJ < kU is reected by the fact that the schedule wJ (U ) is further away from the origin than the
schedule wU (J), and as a result, the optimal degree of curriculum centralization for Japan, 
w
J , is
higher than that for the US, wU . Let p
w indicate the free trade equilibrium price when (wJ ; 
w
U ) are
adopted.
Note that these two FOCs, (18) and (19), coincide with the FOC (16) for small open economies
taking the trade price as given. The intuition for this result is that the terms-of-trade considerations
in setting  when countries perceive their market powers are neutralized in a world social planners
problem since one countrys terms-of-trade gain is the other countrys terms-of-trade loss. This
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can be seen in the derivations of (18), where the e¤ects of J on p and the e¤ects of p on the joint
income and welfare of the two countries are eliminated in the nal expression. The only things that
matter are the direct e¤ect of J on Japans own production choice and that of U on the USs own
production choice. Thus, the optimal choice of education systems by a world social planner turns
out to be the same as the noncooperative equilibrium choice of education systems by individual
countries if they behave as price takers.
Proposition 2 The optimal choice of education systems (wJ ; 
w
U ) by a world social planner that
maximizes the world welfare under trade coincides with the noncooperative equilibrium choice of
education systems by individual countries behaving as price takers in the world market. Relative
to autarky, the di¤erence in education styles is further enlarged after trade in the world socially
optimal outcome: wJ > 
a
J > 
a
U > 
w
U .
Proof. If Japan behaves as a price taker, its FOC to maximize its aggregate welfare is (16)
with k = kJ , which is identical to the world social planners FOC (18). Thus, wJ (U ) can also be
regarded as Japans best response function, when Japan behaves as a price taker, where the price
taken as given by Japan follows the trade equilibrium condition (13) for given U and J . Similarly,
wU (J) can also be regarded as the USs best response function, when the US behaves as a price
taker. The noncooperative equilibrium outcome, when each of these two countries maximizes their
individual welfare but behaves as price takers, occurs at the intersection W of the two schedules
wJ (U ) and 
w
U (J), which is identical to the world social planners choice. This proves the rst
part of the proposition.
To show the second part of the proposition, note that if kU were to decrease to the level of
kJ , wU (J) would shift out (not shown) in Figure 2 and intersect 
w
J (U ) at point WJ on the 45

line. This is the hypothetical world social planners choice if both countries had identical disutility
factors equal to kJ . But if both countries were identical, the equilibrium trade price would be equal
to either countrys autarky price. In particular, this is Japans realized autarky price with kJ .
Hence, the level of J corresponding to point WJ is Japans autarky optimal choice of education
system, given that the FOC for Japans autarky decision (15) and the FOC for the world social
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Figure 2: Endogenous Choice of Education System
planners decision of Japans education system (18) are identical if evaluated at the same price
level.
Analogously, if kJ were to increase to the level of kU , wJ (U ) would shift in (not shown) and
intersect wU (J) at point WU on the 45
 line in Figure 2. This is the hypothetical world social
planners choice if both countries had identical disutility factors equal to kU . But then the equi-
librium trade price would be equal to either countrys autarky price. In particular, this is the
USs realized autarky price with kU . Hence, the level of U corresponding to point WU is the USs
autarky optimal choice of education system, given that the FOC for the USs autarky decision (15)
and the FOC for the world social planners decision of the USs education system (19) are identical
if evaluated at the same price.
Thus, the combination of the socially optimal education systems under autarky in the two
countries corresponds to point A in Figure 2. It lies to the northwest of the world social planners
choice with trade W . The result wJ > 
a
J > 
a
U > 
w
U therefore follows.
Thus, from the worlds perspective, it is socially optimal to further enlarge the autarky di¤erence
in the education systems between Japan and the US to reinforce their initial pattern of comparative
23
advantage and to maximize the gains from trade. With endogenous education policies (and PPFs),
the output response to the possibility of trade is more elastic and the potential gains from trade
are bigger than classical trade theories with given PPFs would suggest. Not only does the world
aggregate production increase as individual countries reallocate more productive resources to their
sector of comparative advantage (corresponding to a movement along the given PPF), but it is
further enlarged as individual countries revise their education policies (and restructure their PPFs)
to be further skewed toward their sector of comparative advantage.
Nash Equilibrium Choice. If countries choose education systems unilaterally (as is likely
the case in reality) and take into consideration the terms-of-trade e¤ect of their education policies,
the resulting Nash equilibrium (nJ ; 
n
U ; p
n) tends to di¤er from the above socially optimal outcome
(wJ ; 
w
U ; p
w). The intuition is that Japan would not want to raise J in the Nash equilibrium as
much as it would as a price taker (or in the world optimal outcome), since a higher J increases the
auto output, depresses the world price of cars which it exports, and hurts its terms of trade; the
reverse is true for the US, who would not want to lower U in the Nash equilibrium as much as it
would as a price taker. Such a terms-of-trade loss is ignored by a small open economy, or is o¤set
by the equivalent terms-of-trade gain of the other country in a world social planners calculation.
Thus, by taking the terms-of-trade e¤ect into consideration, countries tend to specialize less than
in the socially optimal outcome. This is formally proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In a free trade equilibrium where each country simultaneously chooses its education
system taking as given the other countrys choice, the education systems in Japan and the US diverge
more from their autarky levels but less than the socially optimal levels: wJ > 
n
J > 
a
J > 
a
U >
nU > 
w
U :
Proof. The objective function of Japan is
(20) max
J
UJ(J ; U ) = 
(1  )1 p (1 )(YAJ + pYSJ)  kJJ
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subject to the trade equilibrium condition (13). The FOC for a best response nJ(U ) given U is
@UJ(J ; U )
@J
=
"
(1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YAJ
@J

p
+ p
@YSJ
@J

p
+
@YAJ
@p
@p
@J
+ p
@YSJ
@p
@p
@J
+ YSJ
@p
@J
  (1  )p 1(YAJ + pYSJ) @p
@J

  kJ
=
"
(1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YAJ
@J

p
+ p
@YSJ
@J

p
+ 
YSJYAU   YSUYAJ
YAJ + YAU
@p
@J

  kJ = 0:(21)
The second equality follows again by the fact that MRT = p and by plugging in the trade equilib-
rium condition (13). Given that @p@J > 0 by Lemma 5, it follows that
YSJYAU YSUYAJ
YAJ+YAU
@p
@J
Q 0 if and
only if J R U . Comparing the FOC for nJ(U ) in (21) with the FOC for wJ (U ) in (18) implies
that nJ(U ) Q wJ (U ) if and only if J R U . The position of nJ(U ) relative to wJ (U ) is illustrated
in Figure 2. For example, in the area below the 45 line we have J > U , which implies YAJ > YAU
and YSU > YSJ so that the term
YSJYAU YSUYAJ
YAJ+YAU
@p
@J
is negative; this in turn suggests that the best
response function nJ(U ) lies to the left of 
w
J (U ) of the world social planner. In addition, the
divergence between the two is larger, the more asymmetric the two countries are in their education
systems and hence in their production patterns (reected as a larger term YSJYAU YSUYAJYAJ+YAU in ab-
solute value). The opposite is true for the area above the 45 line, where J < U and thus nJ(U )
lies to the right of wJ (U ). Finally, the two lines 
n
J(U ) and 
w
J (U ) cross each other on the 45

line when J = U , as in this case, the two countries have the same production structures and the
term YSJYAU YSUYAJYAJ+YAU
@p
@J
is equal to zero.
The objective function of the US is
(22) max
U
UU (U ; J) = 
(1  )1 p (1 )(YAU + pYSU )  kUU
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subject to the trade equilibrium condition (13). The FOC for a best response nU (J) given J can
be obtained analogously:
@UU (U ; J)
@U
=
"
(1  )1 p (1 )
 
@YAU
@U

p
+ p
@YSU
@U

p
+ 
YSUYAJ   YSJYAU
YAJ + YAU
@p
@U

  kU = 0:(23)
By the same token, the term YSUYAJ YSJYAUYAJ+YAU
@p
@U
R 0 if and only if J R U . Comparing the FOC
for nU (J) in (23) with the FOC for 
w
U (J) in (19) implies that 
n
U (J) R wU (J) if and only if
J R U ; similarly, the divergence between the two is larger, the more asymmetric the two countries
are in their education systems, and as a result, in their production patterns. The position of nU (J)
relative to wU (J) is illustrated in Figure 2.
The Nash equilibrium (nJ ; 
n
U ; p
n) is determined jointly by the two FOCs (21) and (23). It
occurs at the intersection N of the two schedules nJ(U ) and 
n
U (J) in Figure 2 and lies to the
northwest of the world social planners choice W but to the southeast of the autarky choice A;
thus, it follows that wJ > 
n
J > 
a
J > 
a
U > 
n
U > 
w
U .
Note that in either the individual autarky optimization problem or the world social planners
optimization problem, the e¤ect of the endogenous price change on the autarky welfare or the joint
world welfare is zero. A software price increase has a positive income e¤ect scaled by the output of
the software industry. At the same time, it entails a negative consumption e¤ect. In autarky, the
two e¤ects o¤set each other, as production equals consumption. In the joint welfare calculation,
the two e¤ects similarly o¤set each other, as the two countriesjoint production equals their joint
consumption.
This is not the case when countries optimize individual welfare under trade. For an auto-
exporting country, it produces relatively less software than it consumes; thus, a software price
increase will lead to relatively less income gain than consumption loss, and as a result, an overall
terms-of-trade loss. The opposite is true for the software-exporting country. Hence, whenever
J > U and as a result, Japan is an exporter of cars, Japan would not want to raise its degree
of curriculum centralization as high as the world social planners optimal choice, because a higher
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degree of curriculum centralization increases the auto output, increases the relative price of software
which it imports, and creates a terms-of-trade loss. In contrast, the US, as an exporter of software,
would not want to lower its degree of curriculum centralization as low as the world social planners
optimal choice, because a lower degree of curriculum centralization increases the software output,
decreases its relative price, and creates a terms-of-trade loss. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, nJ(U )
lies to the left of wJ (U ) while 
n
U (J) lies above 
w
U (J) in the area to the right of the 45
 line where
J > U .
The more asymmetric the two countries are in their education systems and hence the more
imbalanced they are in their production structures, the stronger the terms-of-trade e¤ect. This is
reected in Figure 2 by the larger distance between nJ(U ) and 
w
J (U ) or that between 
n
U (J) and
wU (J) as one moves further away from the 45
 line. As indicated by Figure 2, the two countries
education systems at the Nash equilibrium (point N) are more divergent than in autarky (point
A), but are not as divergent as would be prescribed by the world social planners optimal choice
(point W ).
4 Empirical Relevance
In this section, we present some measures of curriculum centralization in education systems and
its e¤ects on talent diversity. We also provide some preliminary empirical evidence on the e¤ects
of trade intensity change on cross-country di¤erences in education systems.
The measures are constructed based on data from the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS), an international assessment of math and science knowledge of the fourth-
grade and eighth-grade students around the world. Our curriculum centralization and student
performance measures are based on grade 8 results, which presumably exhibit a larger inuence of
education systems than those of grade 4 (Hanushek and Kimko 2000). TIMSS was rst administered
in 1995 and every four years thereafter (1999, 2003, and 2007). Participating countries, however,
vary across years. Since talent diversity in reality may be a¤ected by many factors in addition to
curriculum, such as the initial talent pool, access to public education and investment in education,
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we focus on the sample of participating OECD countries, which are relatively homogeneous in these
other relevant controls.9
Score Diversity Measure. Following the literature, we measure a countrys talent diversity
by the standard deviations of the math/science scores divided by their means. Specically, it is
measured by (mm +
s
s
)=2, where m and m are, respectively, the standard deviation and the mean
of the math scores for the eighth-grade students, while s and s are those for science scores.
10
Curriculum Centralization Measure. Given the data in TIMSS, there are two plausible
ways to measure curriculum centralization in a country. The rst measure is based on the responses
of the national representative to the curriculum questionnaire which asks whether any of the seven
listed methods are used to help implement the national mathematics (science) curriculum at grade
8. The measure is the sum of yes (=1) or no (=0) answers to the seven questions if there exists
such a national curriculum, and it is zero if no national curriculum exists in a country.11 Since the
answers are often the same for both math and science curricula in the sample of OECD countries,
the nal measure is the average of the two, and its scale is normalized to the unit interval. A larger
measure indicates a higher degree of curriculum centralization at the national level. This measure
is available only in the 2003 survey.
Countries with similar stated centralization policies at the national level, however, may di¤er
from each other in their actual implementation practices at the school level; the di¤erences may also
evolve over time even when the written policy does not change (Astiz et al. 2002). In view of this,
our second measure of curriculum centralization incorporates information of school-level practices,
where we take the average of the national-level measure constructed above and the school-level
implementation index discussed below.
9Appendix B gives the list of participating OECD countries. In particular, we will restrict our attention to the
OECD countries which were current members by 2003 (when the last TIMSS survey used in our study was conducted),
and where all regions in a country participated in TIMSS together.
10These statistics can be found in TIMSS 1995 Mathematics (Science) Achievement in the Middle School Years
Table E.3, TIMSS 1999 International Mathematics (Science) Report Exhibit D.2, and TIMSS 2003 International
Mathematics (Science) Report Exhibit D.2.
11See Q.1A and Q.3 in TIMSS 2003 Curriculum Questionnaire for Mathematics, and Q.1A and Q.4 in TIMSS 2003
Curriculum Questionnaire for Science. The seven listed methods are: a) mandated or recommended textbook(s),
b) instructional or pedagogical guide, c) ministry notes and directives, d) curriculum evaluation during or after
implementation, e) specically developed or recommended instructional activities, f) national assessments based on
student samples, g) a system of school inspection or audit. The data are found in the les, BUGMATM3.xls and
BUGSCIM3.xls, from TIMSS 2003.
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In TIMSS 1995 and 1999, the school questionnaire addressed to school principals includes 15
questions regarding the importance of various forces in determining the curriculum. These 15
forces can be regarded to represent centralizing or decentralizing forces in view of our model.
For instance, the rst question asks How much inuence does the National Curriculum Council
have in determining curriculum? where 1=none, 2=a little, 3=some and 4=a lot. In light of
our theory, this factor represents a centralizing force as it tends to impose homogeneity on the
curriculum structures across schools. So are two other factors, National Subject Association and
external examinations/standardized tests, asked in two other questions. In contrast, the remaining
12 factors in the list refer to local or school forces which tend to introduce heterogeneity in curricula
across schools.12 The importance of each variable (ranging from 1 to 4) is the average response of
all valid samples in a country. If a variable was coded as N.A. for all cases in a country, we treat it as
having no inuence in the country and assign the variable a value of 1, since the most likely reason
for this case is that the question was not applicable to the countrys context. For example, the US
does not have a national curriculum council and the question was not administered in 1995.13 The
school-level implementation index is calculated as the ratio of the average importance of the three
centralizing forces and the average importance of the 12 decentralizing forces; it is then normalized
to the unit interval to be consistent with the national-level measure.14
The national-level measure has good international comparability, as the curriculum question-
naire is answered by a national representative, and the relevant questions we use in constructing the
measure are the same across countries. In contrast, some questions used in the school-level index
could be deleted or modied by countries in accordance with their national education systems.
The adaptations could also di¤er across waves of surveys in the same country. As a result, the
12See items SCQ2-13A to SCQ2-13O in TIMSS 1995 Population 2 School Questionnaire, and items SCQ2-9A to
SCQ2-9O in TIMSS 1999 School Questionnaire. The questions refer to the inuence of: A) National Curriculum
Council, B) National Subject Association, C) Educational region or district, D) School governing board, E) Princi-
pal/head of school, F) Teachers (collectively for the school), G) Teachers (of same subject) as a group, H) Each teacher
individually, I) Parents, J) Students, K) Church/religious groups, L) Business community, M) Textbook publishers,
N) External examinations/standardized tests, O) Teacher unions. The options in A)D) may be modied in accor-
dance with national education systems. The data are found in the les, BSALM92M1.TXT or BSALM42M1.TXT
from TIMSS 1995, and bsalm3_m2.pdf or bsalm4_m2.pdf from TIMSS 1999.
13See TIMSS 1995 User Guide for the Primary and Middle School Years (Chapter 7-30) for more discussions of
N.A. entries.
14This school-level index is highly correlated with the 1995 operational centralization measure in Astiz et al. (2002).
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cross-country comparability of the school-level index by itself is noisy.15 Thus, the average of the
national-level measure and the school-level implementation index aims to capture the international
comparability of the national-level measure and at the same time to incorporate the time-series
variation in the tendency of curriculum centralization observed at the school level. Because the
national-level measure is only observed in 2003 while the school-level index is only observed in 1995
and 1999, the centralization measure for 1995 is constructed as the average of the 1995 school-level
index and the 2003 national-level measure. The centralization measure for 1999 is constructed
similarly.16
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Figure 3: Curriculum Centralization and Score Diversity 1995
Curriculum Centralization and Score Diversity. When we regress the score diversity on
the degree of curriculum centralization in the sample of OECD countries, a negative and statistically
signicant relationship emerges in all three years of surveys.17 Figure 3 presents the regression
15For example, the US did not administer the question of National Curriculum Council in 1995, but replaced the
option by Voluntary National Standards in 1999. In this case, we recoded the 1999 score for the variable to 1 as
in 1995, judging that the substitute option does not constitute o¢ cial standards with enforcement power. In other
cases, it is less than clear whether and how any adjustment should be made. See TIMSS 1995 User Guide for the
Primary and Middle School Years Supplement 3 (Section 7-8), and TIMSS 1999 User Guide Supplement 2 (Section
4-6 to 4-8) for the complete list of national adaptations of the school questionnaire.
16 Ideally, the national-level measure and the school-level index of the same year should be used in the average, but
data for the 1995/1999 national-level measure are absent. It is reckoned that the national-level measure reects the
slow-moving component of education policies and likely does not change much in the short run.
17Robust standard errors are used in the estimation.
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result for year 1995, where the estimated slope coe¢ cient is negative and highly signicant.18 The
same result also holds for year 1999; as shown in Figure 4, the estimated slope is quite similar to
that in 1995 even though the samples are slightly di¤erent. Figure 5 suggests that the negative
and signicant relationship between curriculum centralization and score diversity also holds in
2003 when the national-level measure of curriculum centralization is used. These results suggest
that the more centralized a countrys curriculum structure is, the more homogeneous its student
performance tends to be, which is consistent with our theoretical characterization of the education
system and its e¤ect on talent distribution.19 Incidentally, the data also show clearly that the US
and Japan indeed have the most extreme education systems in terms of curriculum centralization
in the sample of countries.
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Figure 4: Curriculum Centralization and Score Diversity 1999
Education System and Trade. Our theory predicts a wider divergence in education policies
between countries as they go from no trade to completely free trade. In reality, we do not observe
the autarky state but the rise and fall in trade intensity between countries. Thus, we look instead
18Among the 11 OECD countries who participated in both TIMSS 1995 and 2003 (so that the 1995 curriculum
centralization measure can be constructed), Italy does not have the 1995 score and school survey data, and Norway
does not have the 1995 centralization measure data.
19The results are very similar if we regress the score diversity on curriculum centralization with a four-year lag
(e.g., the score diversity of 1999 on the curriculum centralization in 1995) or with a eight-year lag.
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Figure 5: Curriculum Centralization and Score Diversity 2003
at the relationship between the change in bilateral trade intensity over time for a pair of countries
and the corresponding change in their education styles to see whether the empirical pattern is
consistent with our prediction.
A second caveat is that our theoretical prediction is more of a long-run relationship, but mea-
sures of curriculum centralization comparable across countries over a long period of time are not
available. What we have are the second measures of curriculum centralization for both 1995 and
1999. In this time frame, they likely reect more of short-run variations in the school-level im-
plementation than long-run shifts in the national-level policy. They are also relatively noisy for
reasons mentioned above. Given this, it is likely di¢ cult to detect a systematic relationship between
education and trade based on this dataset. Therefore, in the end, the empirical evidence we can
show is extremely preliminary.
The change in relative di¤erence in education systems between a pair of countries (k; l) is
measured by jcentralk;99 centrall;99j jcentralk;95 centrall;95j, where centralc;t is the curriculum
centralization measure for country c in year t.20 The larger the measure, the more divergent the
20To accommodate a swap in the relative ranking of centralization between a pair of countries, a more general
measure sign(centralk;99   centrall;99)  [(centralk;99   centrall;99)   (centralk;95   centrall;95)], should be used.
When such swaps do not occur, which is the case for the sample used in the trade regression, it is equivalent to the
measure shown in the text.
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Figure 6: Education System Di¤erence and Trade Intensity
two countrieseducation policies have become from 1995 to 1999.
The trade intensity between a pair of countries (k; l) in a year is measured by the average of
their bilateral export intensity ( export(k;l)GDP (k) +
export(l;k)
GDP (l) )=2, where export(k; l) indicates the amount
of exports from country k to country l. We take a ve-year moving average; for example, the trade
intensity measure for 1995 is the average over the years from 1990 to 1994. This moving-average
trade measure accommodates possible time lag of trade pattern in inuencing education policies;
it also helps smooth out short-run uctuations in the trade ows.21 For this analysis, the sample
of OECD countries is further reduced to those with both 1995 and 1999 curriculum centralization
measures and for which the bilateral trade data are available in both years.22
Figure 6 presents the result of regressing the change of relative di¤erence in curriculum central-
ization between a pair of countries on the change in their bilateral trade intensity between 1995
and 1999. The estimated slope coe¢ cient is positive and the tted line passes through (0; 0) ap-
proximately. Thus, pairs of OECD countries that become more intensive in their bilateral trade
21The bilateral trade data (denominated in the US currency) are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
database in July 2010. The GDP data in the US currency are constructed from the GDP data in local currencies and
the exchange rate series from the IMF International Financial Statistics database (accessed in August 2010). The
period-average exchange rate series are used.
22Among the eight common countries in Figures 3 and 4, Slovak Republic does not have the 1995 trade intensity
data with the other countries.
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from 1995 to 1999 tend to become more divergent from each other in their degrees of curriculum
centralization, and vice versa. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction. Given the caveats
noted above, the result is quite encouraging, although the estimation is not statistically signicant
at the conventional level. That said, it is clear that having comparable measures of curriculum
centralization at extended periods of time is necessary to provide more persuasive ndings. We
leave this for future work.
5 Discussions
Modeling Choices. Grossman and Maggi (2000) introduce a stylized framework to analyze the
e¤ects of talent distribution on trade pattern, taking the underlying talent distribution as given.
In particular, the framework emphasizes the coexistence of a supermodular sector (say, auto) and
a submodular sector (say, software) with the production technology of both sectors consisting of
two tasks and exhibiting constant returns to talent used in the two tasks. The supermodular (sub-
modular) production technology is characterized by input complementarity (substitutability) and
thus encourages self-matching (cross-matching) in the abilities of workers constituting a produc-
tion team. With constant returns to overall talent, the supermodular (submodular) production
technology also implies a decreasing (increasing) return to individual talent in a production team.
It may be useful to explain why we are not adopting their exact production technology spec-
ications, and to what extent our alternative specications have preserved or deviated from the
characteristics of their framework. First, given constant returns to overall talent in their framework,
a countrys maximum output in the supermodular sector depends only on the countrys mean talent
level, while its maximum output in the submodular sector increases with the countrys talent diver-
sity. With an endogenous education policy as introduced above, an increase in  does not alter the
mean ability and the maximum output of the supermodular good, but decreases the talent diversity
and the maximum output of the submodular good. Thus there would be no trade-o¤ in setting ,
and a lower  strictly dominates a higher one, defeating any purpose to rationalize di¤erent choices
of  across countries. Thus, we preserve the supermodularity but impose decreasing returns to
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overall talent in the auto sector, so that an increase in  increases the maximum output of the
supermodular good. We generalize their original 2-task framework to n-tasks for the supermodular
sector, which is a straightforward generalization and agrees with the image of a long production
chain typical of such production processes.
Second, given the modications to the supermodular sector, the e¤ects of goods price change
on the wage structure of the software worker and hence the talent allocation across the two sectors
cannot be signed, which hinders attempts of comparative statics analysis. Thus, we simplify the
submodular production technology in the software sector to consist of only a single task instead of
two; actually, with a submodular production technology, it increases the aggregate output to break
up a production team of any size and conduct the work individually, which was also pointed out by
Grossman and Maggi (2000). The increasing return to individual talent in a submodular production
process is preserved by assuming an increasing return to the talent used in the single task. Given
the alternative technology specications, the convexity of the software industrys wage structure
is preserved, while the auto industrys wage structure becomes concave instead of being linear,
reecting the decreasing returns to overall talent. Instead of two cuto¤s in the talent allocation
reecting cross-matching of the lowest and the highest abilities of workers in the software industry
in Grossman and Maggi (2000), there is only one cuto¤ in the talent allocation in our framework:
the less-talented workers self-match to toil in the auto sector and only the more-talented workers
choose to work alone in the software sector. Thus, our framework does not imply a necessarily higher
talent (wage) dispersion in the submodular sector as would arise in the framework of Grossman
and Maggi (2000).
The main results of this paper on the pattern of endogenous education systems following trade
are robust to many variations to the current technology specications. In fact, any such specica-
tions that lead to the comparative static results ( @YA@

p
> 0 > @YS@

p
) in Lemma 2 will su¢ ce. In
other words, as long as the output of one industry increases in the homogeneity of abilities while
that of the other industry decreases in it, our main results will go through. More generally, our
analytical framework and results can be applied to other dimensions of education systems as long
as they a¤ect di¤erent industries in distinct ways.
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In the model, we have taken country sizes to be the same across countries (with a unit measure
of population). As the production technologies in both sectors exhibit constant returns to scale (the
measure of population, say, L) and the preferences are identical and homothetic in the two countries,
the country sizes can di¤er without a¤ecting the comparative advantage and trade pattern. It is
also straightforward to verify that introduction of di¤erent country sizes (LJ , LU ) will not a¤ect
the qualitative results regarding the endogenous choice of education systems.
In the main text, we have used a linear disutility function to capture the cost for a country to
implement a certain degree of curriculum centralization. A more general functional form can be
adopted without changing our substantial results. For example, an alternative disutility functional
form could be K(; k), where the disutility increases with the level of curriculum centralization 
and a parameter k, with @K(;k)@@k > 0 such that the marginal disutility with respect to  is higher
when k is larger.
Education and Skills. The education system in the model is characterized by a single para-
meter  that measures the level of curriculum centralization imposed on educators/students, where
a more centralized education system decreases the skill gaps among students but by its very na-
ture also reduces the diversity in talent. Available evidence suggests that this captures the crucial
di¤erence between the Japanese and the US education systems. The US students, for example,
exhibit larger diversity in international test scores in math and science than the Japanese students
as we have seen in the empirical section, and the more so among the secondary-school students
than the elementary-school students (Hanushek and Kimko 2000, Hanushek 2002). Some scholars
argue that initiative, creativity, and entrepreneurship are emphasized more in the US education,
which are di¢ cult to measure by standardized tests (Mayer, Tajika, and Stanley 1991, Bracey 2002,
Ramirez et al. 2006). While we acknowledge that it is possible to increase the basic skill level in
some dimensions (e.g., reading, math and science) for all students without reducing the desirable
diversity in other dimensions, our key insight on the fundamental trade-o¤ among di¤erent sets of
skills remains valid, since resources that can be devoted to all these dimensions of skills cannot be
unlimited and thus some tough allocation decisions have to be made. Hence, it is almost inevitable
that when countries vary in their emphasis on di¤erent combinations of skills, this will have a
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bearing on their comparative advantages in trade.
The education parameter  in our model can be interpreted in alternative ways to represent
di¤erent features of an education system. For example, it is possible to interpret  as the degree
of ability pooling in school, the prevalence of public schools and the degree of income equality.
The links between these three factors and skill diversity in a closed economy have been studied
extensively in the literature of economics of education.23 Given our main focus on the dynamics
between two sectors and two trading countries, we have chosen not to explicitly model these factors,
except for the part captured by .24 By focusing on the degree of curriculum centralization, our
paper also highlights a distinct aspect of the education system that has not received much attention
in the literature but that could exert fundamental e¤ects on a countrys talent composition, sectoral
specialization, and comparative advantage in trade. That said, it would be interesting in future
research to consider a richer model that takes into account multiple features of an education system
and to work out their interactions in shaping the talent distribution.
Stable Di¤erence in Education Systems. Our model shows that the contrasting styles of
education systems in the US and Japan could be a long-term equilibrium outcome that is compatible
with and reinforced by their trade pattern. Their initial di¤erence, which was possibly due to
distinct cultural and political contexts, could be moderate but then gets reinforced over time and
becomes di¢ cult to reverse (short of dramatic shocks to the trade pattern).
A large degree of decentralization has long been a distinguishing feature of the US education
system, and the evolution of this organization structure, dating back to the colonial era, has been at
least partially serendipitous (Black and Sokolo¤ 2006). The decentralized structure in nancing
and administering schools by local or state authorities, through enhanced experimentation and
exibility and focused attention to local environments, has served the US quite well. Though in
recent decades there are certain concerns about the relatively low performance of the US students
23For example, see Bénabou (1996), Epple and Romano (1998), Fernández and Rogerson (1998), and Takii and
Tanaka (2009) among others.
24Allowing unequal educational resources to exert extra inuence on skill diversity is not likely to change our main
results. For example, starting from the same inequality in educational resources in both Japan and US, a higher
 in Japan leads to a more homogenous skill pool, which will then lead to a lower income inequality that in turn
contributes to even more homogenous skills in future generations in comparison to the US. Thus, the e¤ect of  on
skill diversity is enlarged by allowing unequal resources.
37
in international tests compared with other developed countries, and some policies are adopted to
address the under-performing poor school districts (Dillon 2007, 2009), it does not appear that the
distinctive features of the US education system, such as its decentralized manner, relatively low
pressure on students, and emphasis on individual initiative and creativity, will change at all.
As a latecomer in modern education, Japan in the Meiji era experimented with local funding and
operation of education only to discover that the people would not pay, so after only a few years of
this experiment, the Meiji state took over the full burden of nancing the public school system. ...
The reliance on state support was associated with a uniform curriculum, a central system for exams
and textbook production, and other centralizing tendenciesthat deliver more homogeneous student
outcomes than the decentralized US education system (Cummings 1999). Similar experiences were
repeated during the American occupation of Japan after the World War II; the decentralization
e¤ort initiated by the American was reversed years later to t traditional Japanese models more
closely (Beauchamp 1987). In recent years, in an e¤ort to prevent cram education and boost
individual potentials and ability to think, Japan has experimented with various teaching methods
under the so-called Yutori (Relaxed) Education. However, the new education guidelines have again
met with strong resistance from education experts and parents.25 These experiences illustrate the
di¢ culty to reverse the initial pattern of a countrys education style.
6 Concluding Remarks
While the important role of education in enhancing a countrys international competitiveness has
been recognized by many countries, the e¤ects of international trade on education policies are
not well understood. In an attempt to shed light on this issue, this paper provides a theory on
the simultaneous determination of a countrys education system and its comparative advantage in
trade. Countries have to face trade-o¤ when choosing a particular style of education system (a
more centralized curriculum structure tends to promote talent homogeneity, while a more exible
one encourages talent diversity). Since talent diversity a¤ects industry productivities, the choice of
education system will inevitably have a bearing on a nations comparative advantage. An interesting
25See for example http://www.mext.go.jp/english/org/struct/014.htm, and Takayama (2007).
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implication of the papers analysis is that trade plays an important role in shaping cross-country
di¤erences in education systems, because trade enhances countries incentives to become more
specialized in their sector of comparative advantage and to further di¤erentiate their education
policies. The empirical analysis based on the TIMSS dataset nds a signicant and negative e¤ect
of curriculum centralization on talent diversity for participating OECD countries in various years
of study, and this supports our theoretical characterization of education systems. The theoretical
prediction of a positive relationship between divergence in education systems and increased trade
intensity is a hypothesis di¢ cult to verify given the limited data on curriculum centralization,
although our preliminary ndings are in line with the theory.
The current paper focuses on how the trade pattern and education systems between two ad-
vanced industrial economies interact, and how, as a result, persistent di¤erences in education sys-
tems across countries arise in the equilibrium. A fruitful topic in future research may be to study
how the education system of a country, competing and trading in the world economy, evolves dy-
namically over time as it advances across development stages. In future work, one may also want
to extend the current papers analysis to allow the education policy to be determined by political
economy, where parents express their preferred education system via voting or where industrial in-
terests exert inuence on policy makers. Last but not least, as discussed in Section 5, an ambitious
but interesting extension could be to allow for multiple features of an education system (e.g., the
degree of curriculum centralization, the ratio of public versus private school, or the use of ability
streaming), and to study how these factors interact in determining a countrys talent diversity and
their endogenous equilibrium in open economies.
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APPENDIX A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. First note that p  pm implies that the mean ability workers are engaged in the auto
sector, i.e., am  ea. Next, note that YA (p; ) can be rewritten as
YA (p; ) = 
Z ea
al
af(a)da
= 
Z ea0
al0
((1  )a0 + am) g(a0)da0;
where ea0  ea am1  , and f() and g() are the probability density functions corresponding to F ()
and G(), respectively. We have
@YA
@

p
= 
Z ea0
al0
((1  )a0 + am) 1 (am   a0) g(a0)da0
+
@ea0
@
((1  )ea0 + am) g(ea0)
=

(1  )
Z ea
al
a 1 (am   a) f(a)da
+

(1  )2ea(ea  am)f(ea) > 0:
To see the positive sign, note that the second term is weakly positive, as am  ea for the given price
range p  pm. Next, note that the rst term is positive because
Z ea
al
a 1 (am   a) f(a)da >
Z ea
al
a 1m (am   a) f(a)da > 0;
where the rst inequality follows because a 1(am   a) > a 1m (am   a) holds for any a and any
 < 1: it holds for a < am, as in this case, am   a > 0 and a 1 > a 1m , and for a > am, as in this
case, am   a < 0 and a 1 < a 1m . The second inequality follows since
R ea
al
a f(a)F (ea)da < am.
The e¤ect of  on YS (holding p constant) can be shown in a similar way. Note that YS(p; ) =
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R ahea af(a)da = R ah0ea0 ((1  )a0 + am) g(a0)da0, and
@YS
@

p
= 
Z ah0
ea0 ((1  )a0 + am)
 1 (am   a0)g(a0)da0
 @ea0
@
((1  )ea0 + am) g(ea0)
=

1  
Z ah
ea a 1(am   a)f(a)da
  1
(1  )2ea(ea  am)f(ea) < 0:
The above negative sign holds because the second term is weakly negative again for the same reason
that am  ea for the given price range p  pm, and because the rst term is negative for
Z ah
ea a 1(am   a)f(a)da <
Z ah
ea a 1m (am   a)f(a)da < 0:
The rst inequality follows because a 1(am   a) < a 1m (am   a) holds for any a and any  > 1,
and the last inequality follows because
R ahea a f(a)1 F (ea)da > am.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. Dene a  R eaal a f(a)F (ea)da and a  R ahea a f(a)1 F (ea)da, and note that a < am < a. Further
note that F (am) = G(am)  12 by condition (A1). By (11), we have the following condition on the
equilibrium price, omitting the decoration to simplify presentations:
p =
1  


R ea
al
adF (a)R ahea adF (a) < 1   a
F (ea)
a

[1  F (ea)]
<
1  

a m
F (ea)
[1  F (ea)]  a m F (ea)[1  F (ea)] ;(24)
where the rst inequality follows by the concavity (convexity) of the auto (software) production,
the second inequality by the fact that a < am < a, and the last weak inequality by the condition
that   12 .
Suppose that ea < am. By (7), this implies that p > pm; on the other hand, by (24) and the
condition that F (am)  12 , this implies that p < a m F (am)[1 F (am)]  a
 
m  pm, a contradiction.
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Thus, it must be the case that am  ea at the equilibrium, or equivalently, the price must be such
that p  pm at the equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Dene V (p; J ; U )  (1   ) [YAJ(p; J) + YAU (p; U )]   p [YSJ(p; J) + YSU (p; U )].
Condition (13) implies that V (p; J ; U ) = 0, based on which we get
@p
@J
=  
(1  ) @YAJ@J

p
  p @YSJ@J

p
(1  )@(YAJ+YAU )@p   p@(YSJ+YSU )@p   (YSJ + YSU )

p=p
> 0;
since @YAJ@J

p
> 0 > @YSJ@J

p
by Lemma 2, and @YSJ@p > 0 >
@YAJ
@p and
@YSU
@p > 0 >
@YAU
@p by (8), (9),
and Lemma 1. We can show @p@U > 0 analogously.
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APPENDIX B: List of OECD countries participating in TIMSS
TIMSS 1995 TIMSS 1999 TIMSS 2003 TIMSS 2007
End of
4th 8th secondary 8th 4th 8th 4th 8th
OECD countries grade grade school grade grade grade grade grade
AUSTRALIA: 1971 o o o o o o o o
AUSTRIA: 1961 o o o o
BELGIUM: 1961
Belgium (Flemish) o o o o
Belgium (French) o
CANADA: 1961 o o o o
DENMARK: 1961 o o o
FINLAND: 1969 o
FRANCE: 1961 o o
GERMANY: 1961 o o o
GREECE: 1961 o o o
ICELAND: 1961 o o o
IRELAND: 1961 o o
ITALY: 1962 o o o o o o o o
JAPAN: 1964 o o o o o o o
LUXEMBOURG: 1961
NETHERLANDS: 1961 o o o o o o o
NEW ZEALAND: 1973 o o o o o o o
NORWAY: 1961 o o o o o o o
PORTUGAL: 1961 o o
SPAIN: 1961 o
SWEDEN: 1961 o o o o o
SWITZERLAND: 1961 o o
TURKEY: 1961 o o
UNITED KINGDOM: 1961
England o o o o o o o
Scotland o o o o o o
UNITED STATES: 1961 o o o o o o o o
CZECH REPUBLIC: 1995 o o o o o o
HUNGARY: 1996 o o o o o o o
KOREA: 1996 o o o o o
MEXICO: 1994
POLAND: 1996
SLOVAK REPUBLIC: 2000 o o o o
CHILE: 2010 o o
SLOVENIA: 2010 o o o o o o o o
Note: o = participating country. The rst column lists OECD member countries and the year when they
joined OECD. See http://nces.ed.gov/timss/countries.asp for a complete list of participating countries other
than OECD members.
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